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Economics, Social Policy and Social Administration: 
The Interplay between Topics and Disciplines* 
A, J. CULYERt 
ABSTRACT 
The article uses a distinction between topic and discipline to argue that 
social administration, like economics, is characterized by both, but that social 
administration has the special advantage, in treating the topic of social 
policy, of being multi-disciplinary. An account is presented of why 
economics is underrepresented among the disciplines of social administra-
tion, and three important contributory roles are outlined for economics to 
play in the development of social administration. 
Social administration has long suffered from what (at least to an outsider 
like myself) seems to be an identity problem. The role of economics in 
social administration, and the relationships of economists with social 
administrators, have also been plagued by tensions. This article explores 
this problem and these tensions with a view to making some constructive 
analysis of the future role of economics in social administration and, hope-
fully, to generate a discussion. Specifically, the article addresses the status 
of social administration vis-a-vis the other two nouns in the title. However, 
it does not stop there, but proceeds to use the distinctions drawn as the 
basis for a subsequent discussion of the role of economics in social adminis-
tration. 
* This article grew out of an invitation to present a paper at the 1981 Social Administra-
tion Association's conference on the role of economic theory in social administration. It 
reflects an attempt to clear some preliminary ground before tackling in greater detail 
the issues posed by this more specific topic. I have benefited greatly from the comments 
of Brian Abel-Smith, Jonathan Bradshaw, Kay Jones, Ken Judge, Alan Maynard, Albert 
Weale and Jack Wiseman on a draft. I did not expect them to agree with all I have said 
but was delighted to find there was much with which they did agree and grateful to 
be put right at several points. None, of course, can be held entirely responsible for the 
final outcome. 
t Professor of Economics and Deputy Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
University of York. 
0047-2794/ /0000—oo64 $oz.00 © 1981 Cambridge University Press. 
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TOPICS AND DISCIPLINES 
A useful distinction has been made by Alan Williams' between an 'area of 
study' and a 'mode of thinking'. The idea of an area of study connotes a 
 set of phenomena to be studied, problems 'out there' to be comprehended 
and resolved, policies to be investigated, issues to be explored. The idea of 
a mode of thinking connotes the conceptual apparatus — the theory — that 
is to be brought to bear upon the phenomena, problems, policies, issues, et c. 
This paper follows him in using the terms `topic' and 'discipline' as a short-
hand to refer to these two. Each of the nouns in the title will be considered 
in terms of these two basic notions. 
Economics as a topic and a discipline 
I Economics is, first of all, a topic in the sense that `the economy' is a set of 
phenomena which amounts to a reasonably well-defined area of study. 
Unemployment, inflation, the public sector borrowing requirement, the 
behaviour of firms, consumers, the efficiency of markets, and so on, are all 
part of this area which has as its basic distinguishing feature a cash nexus; 
a nexus that exists in markets but not only in markets, a nexus that may 
involve the phenomenon of price but need not; a nexus that may involve 
profits but need not. What seems always to be involved is money or mone-
tarily valued goods and services on at least one side of an exchange rela-
tion. The defining characteristics of economics viewed in this way as a 
financial topic are essentially conventional in nature. They are not logical. 
Nor are they immutable. It is suggested, however, that the features just 
described correspond with what it is that people usually have in mind 
when they talk about the topic, or area of study, called 'the economy'. We 
are therefore essentially identifying 'economics' as a topic with `the 
economy'. 
But economics is, of course, also a discipline that is characterized not at 
all by what economists study but by the way they study it. In the sense of 
discipline, economics is a mode of analyzing the allocation of scarce 
resources. It has, of course, positive and normative variants. The hallmark 
of a discipline is its theory, or theories. Most of us will agree that although 
there are overlaps between economics and other disciplines, the lines of 
analytical demarkation are sufficiently clear for us not to be in much doubt 
about the differences between the disciplines. For example, although both 
political philosophers and economists, when they are being explicitly 
normative, often use utilitarian theory, we do not really have much diffi-
culty distinguishing the two disciplines. Likewise, sociologists and econo- 
1 
 Alan Williams, 'One economist's view of social medicine', Epidemiology and Community Health, 33 (1979), 3-7. 
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m
ists sometimes use Marxian theory, but again we do not have much 
distinguishing the two disciplines. Likewise,- -sociologists and difficulty 
ecoRninists sometimes use Marxian theory, but again we-do-not have-much- 
ty in-clistinguisiting-them. In neither case is this solely due to the 
fact that they may be applying a shared set of fundamental precepts to 
different topics — though historically the evolution of political philosophers' 
a
nd economists' uses of utilitarianism, and the evolution of sociologists' and 
economists uses of Marxian analysis, has undoubtedly been influenced by 
the topics they have chosen to focus upon. Independently of the differentia-
tion of topic, however, it is usually possible for us to make a clear distinc-
tion between the different disciplines' uses of their common intellectual 
heritages. We are not really very likely to confuse a Marxist economist 
with a Marxist sociologist, nor a utilitarian economist with a utilitarian 
political philosopher even when they are talking about the same topic. 
However, some political philosophers have turned themselves into rather 
good economists (and vice versa) and in such cases the two disciplines some-
times lose their separate identities. 
Granted this distinction between disciplines being based on theory and 
topics based on convention, we can move on to an obvious corollary. The 
point is, of course, that the topic economics is not the sole topic to which 
the discipline economics is capable of beng applied, nor is the discipline 
economics the sole discipline capable of being applied to the topic eco-
nomics. It may be that most economists usually apply their discipline of 
economics to the topic of economics. That is scarcely surprising since the 
discipline developed through being mostly applied to that topic. But it does 
not follow that economics as a discipline cannot be fruitfully applied to 
other topics, nor that other disciplines cannot fruitfully be applied to 
economics as a topic. What is true of economics is also true of other social 
sciences. 
Social policy as a topic 
The idea of 'fruitfulness' in the context of social policy applications of 
economics is returned to later. Now, however, let us turn to the second 
noun in the title: social policy. In the light of the foregoing, social policy 
may be viewed as a topic. Like the topic economics, the topic social policy 
is defined conventionally. The conventions defining most topics do not have 
to be, and typically never are, mutually exclusive. For example, the topics 
'economic policy' and 'social policy' each contain elements not shared with 
the other as well as some shared elements. The corporate income tax is a 
topic in economic policy but not social policy; treatment of young offen-
ders is a topic in social policy but not economic policy. Unemployment, 
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health service financing, inflation, however, are examples of topics com mon 
 to both social policy and economic policy. 
The conventionality of topic boundaries is emphasized because there ha s 
 been a lot of misconceived effort devoted to trying to pin them down con-
ceptually in a rigorous and mutually exclusive way. It seems wasteful of 
intelligence so to try, for the definitions are entirely conventional. They 
are also subject to mutation and expansion or contraction. They are also 
subject to change as societies evolve new institutions. A good example of 
such misconceived effort is Cahman and Schmitt 2 which contains a tangled 
muddling of topic and discipline, together with a well-meaning naivete 
about the role of value judgements in analysis and which, not surprisingly, 
fails altogether in its objective — to provide a definition of the 'concept' of 
social policy. 
Admittedly this is an extreme case. Less muddled attempts at a definition 
founder, however, for much the same reason (that is, failure to distinguish 
between on the one hand the conventionality of a topic and on the other 
the disciplines that may be applied to it).tTitmuss's 3 attempt to distinguish 
social policy by means of models of social welfare fails to distinguish social 
from other kinds of policy. For example, the Residual Welfare models need 
not be a model only for social policy, but may be seen to underlie some 
economists' approach to, for example, anti-trust policy: social or govern-
mental institutions are (in such a model) to be brought into play only 
when private markets are seen (or thought) to have broken down suffi-
ciently. Nor, moreover, is his range of possible models complete: there is, 
for example, the 'social choice' model of social (and economic) policy in 
which the choice of social institution for allocating and redistributing 
resources, rights and entitlements, turns on the effectiveness of alternative 
mechanisms, institutions and procedures in meeting conditions imposed by 
a pre-specified 'social welfare function'. Although Titmuss' last major work, 
The Gift Relationship, 5 grew out of an attempt to distinguish the 'eco-
nomic' from the 'social' in public policies it failed signally to do that. This 
does not detract from the central importance of this seminal work but this 
importance lies in its raising of some fundamental issues that are common 
across topics and disciplines rather than in locating issues that differentiate 
in any fundamental sense our topics and disciplines. For example, the 
postulate of caring is an idea that all (or nearly all) the social sciences have 
2 W. J. Cahnman and C. M. Schmitt, 'The concept of social policy (Sozialpolitik)', Journal 
of Social Policy, 8 (1979), 47-59. 
3 R. M. Titmuss, Social Policy: an Introduction, Allen and Unwin, London, 1 974• 
4 Ibid. pp. 30-1. 
5 R. M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1970. 
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to come to terms with, and although Titmuss was broadly right to say 
that, on entirely conventional grounds, the phenomenon of caring may 
be  excluded from, say, economics as a topic, this is conventional — and a 
convention that has never been entirely agreed by all economists 6 and is increasingly being broken.' Moreover, it is too extreme to suppose that the 
idea of caring pervades all social policy. I happen to take the view (though 
I suspect I am in a minority among economists) that one cannot give a 
satisfactory account of the National Health Service, nor make relevant 
policy recommendations about it, without acknowledging that it reflects 
the existence of altruism. But even if it did not and it were seen, say, 
simply as the most efficient way of organizing health services for selfish 
individuals, this would not remove the National Health Service from the 
realm of social policy. Conversely, there are other areas of policy, not 
normally regarded as social policy, where caring may be thought important:, 
current, private and public investment affects the welfare of as yet unborn 
generations about whom we may care; environmental policy impinges on 
many about whom we may care; international relations, trade and aid 
affect the welfare of others about whom we may care; even defence and 
military policies can be seen to contain elements of caring, fellow-feeling 
and moral commitment to others. The importance — arguably the key 
importance — of the idea of caring for the wellbeing of others lies not in its 
enabling us to distinguish social topics from other topics, or one discipline 
from another, but in the fact that it is one of those central concepts (like 
the idea of welfare in utilitarianism) that is — or at least should be — shared 
by many disciplines and which can be found applicable in many topics —
including social policy. It is, thus, an integrating rather than a differenti-
ating concept and therein lies its importance in social science. 8J 
Lafitte escapes most of these difficulties but only at the cost of a rather 
empty tautological notion: 'in the main social policy is an attempt to steer 
the life of society along channels it would not follow if left to itself '. 6 
 T. H. Marshall was much nearer the truth about the conventional nature 
of social policy in the preface to the second edition of his famous book: 'it 
is taken to refer to the policy of governments with regard to action having 
a direct impact on the welfare of the citizens, by providing them with 
6 See F. Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics,.C. Kegan Paul, London, 1$81. 
7  See F. G. Dickinson, Philanthropy and Public Policy, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, New York, 1962; E. S. Phelps (ed.), Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory, 
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1975; D. Collard, Altruism and Economics, Martin 
Robertson, London, 1978. 
8  In emphasizing the idea of caring as an integrating concept of social science I am not, 
of course, implying it is not substantiively important in the analysis of actual policies. 
9 F. Lafitte, Social Policy in a Free Society, Birmingham University Press, Birmingham, 1962. 
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services or income'l° though this unnecessarily restricts the topic of soci al 
policy to policies actually adopted by government, rather than inductin g 
 also those that might be adopted but are not, and those developed by non. 
governmental agencies such as the voluntary social services. 11 His defini. 
tion also suffers from the introduction of a philosophical idea, viz. 
'welfare', 
into an otherwise descriptive and pragmatic definition, as though 
other kinds of policy may not affect welfare. 
For a thoroughly pragmatic alternative approach to the definition 
of social policy that is perfectly consistent with what is argued here Donnison12 is exemplary. , 
 What Donnison winds up with is a list: a list of 
topics that taken together constitute what he calls a research and teaching 
agenda in social policy. The list comes from the things about contemporary 
society in the UK that he considers important to investigate and teach 
people about. It is ad hoc, contemporary and doubtless culture-bound. In 
short, it is conventional. Most will agree that the topics on his list together 
amount to the subject matter we commonly consider to add up to the 
subject matter of social policy. What are they? The social services, of 
course. The consequences for workers of various kinds of a changing indus-
trial structure. The changing character of contracts of work. The distri-
bution of income and wealth. The distribution of public expenditure. The 
consequences of changing patterns of urbanization. Consequences of 
changing patterns in the family. Administrative, legal, economic and poli-
tical questions concerning all of these (these adjectives are used in their 
topical rather than their disciplinary senses). Interactions between these 
various patterns of change, and the social institutions evolved as society 
attempts — or fails — to cope with them. 
Social administration as a topic and a set of disciplines 
Social administration, like economics, is to be characterized by topic and 
discipline. The topic is, of course, social policy currently interpreted as the 
list of matters cited above. As for discipline, social administration is clearly 
multi-disciplinary. It centrally uses sociology, history, geography, psycho-
logy, economics, statistics, ethics and political philosophy — all viewed as 
disciplines rather than topics. Depending on what aspect of social policy is 
being studied it may also draw on epidemiology (for health studies), organi-
zation theory (for administrative studies), accountancy (in studying finan- 
10 T. H. Marshall, Social Policy, Hutchinson, London, 1967. 
11 
 See the introduction in K. Jones (ed.), Yearbook of Social Policy in Britain ion, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973. 
12 D. Donnison, 'Social policy since Titmuss', Journal of Social Policy, 8 ( 1 979), 145-56. 
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dal accountability etc.), anthropology (in comparing social customs etc.), law (in studying the legal framework of policy etc.) and so on. 
While the multi-disciplinary character of social administration is a neces-
sary feature of teaching departments in universities it by no means fol-lows, of course, that individual social administrators themselves need be 
)---rpee  rts in multiple disciplines. It is necessary for each to have a lively 
awareness of, and interest in, the complementary aspects of discipline 
other than their own, and to be able to work with experts in other disci-
plines. There may even be a few souls with both the breadth and depth of 
mind to be able to become competent polymaths — or at least bimaths. But 
this is not necessary — and for all to attempt the acquisition of multiple 
disciplinary skills may even be undesirable if multiple skills can be 
acquired by the average person only at the cost of no great expertise in 
any one of them. It is therefore not surprising — and not necessarily to be 
deplored — that most social administrators as individuals have a principal 
discipline in which they are expert. Of those listed sociology is the disci-
pline most commonly found occupying this principal role." At the same 
time, social administration has evolved true multi-disciplinarians: scholars 
who have sufficient grasp of several disciplines to be able to use them but 
who know enough of their own technical limitations to know when to 
collaborate with the specialist in sociology, econometrics, or whatever, as 
the need arises. There should clearly be room both for those with extensive 
and those with intensive skills as these relate to the disciplines of social 
administration. 
It is sometimes said that the key to an understanding of the discipline of 
social administration is its empiricism — a fluency, grasp and knowledge of 
social policies. In particular it is argued that the empirical traditions of 
social administration give its practitioners special insights into the meaning 
of poverty, the experience of claiming social benefits, what it is like to be 
a nurse on a back ward of a mental hospital, what it is like to be stigma-
tized, and so on. It is hard to see how this could be otherwise. However, 
such insights into and understanding of the complexities of policy and its 
impact (or lack of it) upon clients cannot be held to constitute a discipline 
of social administration — any more than economics, for example, derives 
its disciplinary status from the fluency, grasp and insight possessed by its 
applied practitioners as they investigate the workings of, say, industrial 
33  The reason for this may lie on the 'supply side': the vast expansion in sociology teach- 
ing, in universities since the war and the limited employment prospects for the better 
graduates may have led them to offer themselves relatively more frequently than others 
— including social administration graduates, who came later, were fewer in number, and 
had considerable employment potential elsewhere. (I am grateful to Brian Abel-Smith for 
this point). 
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policy or the balance of payments.These special understandings deriv e 
 indeed from the empirical traditions of disciplines — but as they are applied 
to topics, Thus, while the empirical traditions of social adritinistration, lik
e 
 those of workers on any topic, grant them special expertise and insight, 
they do not bestow disciplinary status. This comes, as argued above, from 
the theoretical basis used to approach empirical topics or, as argued again 
above in the case of social administration, multiple theoretical bases. 
THE CINDERELLA STATUS OF ECONOMICS AMONG THE 
DISCIPLINES OF SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION 
A claimed expertise in the discipline of economics seems to be relativel y 
 rare among social administrators, and it is instructive to explore some 
reasons why. As may by now be expected, the distinction between eco-
nomics the topic and economics the discipline can be used as a rubric for 
organizing some thoughts. 
Taking economics as a topic first, it seems that the traditional areas of 
application of economics have tended to exclude many of the areas we 
think of as falling within the topic of social administration. This is not 
true, of course, of unemployment nor, indeed, of much of the labour 
market. But it was, until relatively recently, certainly true of the social 
services. Since the inclusion of social policy within the scope of a discipline 
is merely a matter of conventions about applicability, we can now see clear 
indications that, whatever was not generally regarded as falling within the 
scope of economics fifteen or twenty years ago, today the scope is by conven-
tion generally regarded as much wider. There is as a result a greater overlap 
than hitherto between the topics of economics and social administration' 
However, one can well imagine the frustration of the not inconsiderable 
number of older academic social administrators who began life as econo-
mists and, through frustration at the arbitrary restrictions imposed upon 
them by the then conventions of economics as a topic, decided that their 
interests could not be pursued along the channels provided by academic 
economics departments. In so far, then, as some social administrators may 
see themselves for this reason as fugitives from the topic of economics, that 
may help account for cinderella status of that discipline among the disci-
plines of social administration, for the distinction between topic and 
discipline is not often made and it is easy to imagine that the faults in the 
conventions regarding the former attach by association to the latter. In 
my judgement this throws out the baby with the bathwater, but not every-
one has the stomach for pushing out the boundaries of a discipline's con-
ventional topic area. Those who do run the risk of becoming suspect by 
their mainstream colleagues as they push out into the 'fringes': they also 
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rim  the risk of earning the resentment of those in other disciplines who 
may feel a property in their conventional topics to be threatened. When 
one added to this the undoubted fact that prestige in economics has invari-
ably attached to those who contribute most to the theory of the discipline 
— who are, so to speak, `disciplinarians'" par excellence — one had a power-
ful set of forces which' jointly conspired to drive out, or make second-rate 
citizens of, those for whom application of economic analysis was the major 
interest and a fortiori those for whom its application was most interesting 
in the topic of social administration. 
As indicated, those days are rapidly passing and may, indeed, have 
already passed. In part the prejudices of academic economists could be 
justified since for many years it was common for economics to be taught 
in two separate compartments, one called 'principles' and the other called 
'applied economics'. It was striking that the one thing that was rarely 
applied in the applied parts of undergraduate courses was economic theory. 
Instead, 'applied economics' tended to be merely institutional and descrip-
tive. This was particularly true for microeconomics. Applied microecono-
mists tended to regard themselves as practical men of affairs, impatient 
with theoretical constructions which they believed anyway to be largely 
inapplicable to any real world problems. It may even be that the empirical 
traditions of this breed of economist were held by them — as is sometimes 
held today by social administrators — to define the 'real' discipline of 
economics. Microeconomic theorists, on the other hand, tended to have a 
philosophical detachment from the real world with their minds set mainly 
on the beauty, rigour and elegance of their abstractions. Economists tended 
to see themselves as either the one or the other kind of economist: neither 
having enormous respect for the other, but the theoretical people having 
most of the prestige. It was the great achievement — arguably the greatest 
achievement — of the revolution in academic economics going by the name 
'positive economics' that it effectively ended this artificial rift within the 
discipline and placed theoretical interpretation of the real world and the 
empirical testing of theoretical propositions about it at the centre of the 
stage. Positive economics was thus inevitably instrumental in the widening 
of economics as a topic and, hence, in making academic economics depart-
ments more comfortable places for those wishing to apply the discipline 
of economics to the topic of social administration. The widening role played 
by the positivist revolution — and herein lies an irony — also inescapably 
14  Economists, sociologists, etc. are identified by their discipline. The discipline is identi-fied by its theory. Hence theoreticians are `disciplinarians' — in quotation marks to 
avoid confusion with the more usual meaning of the word. A social administrator may 
be a •disciplinarian' in this sense or a 'multi-disciplinarian'. 
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- involved economists in facing up to the normative issues involved in soci al 
and economic policy. 
But economics as a discipline also undoubtelly contains within it features 
 that may have contributed to its cinderella status in social administration 
 departments. It is sometimes said that the tightness of economic logic, 
particularly when in mathematical form, is alien to the kind of mind that 
is typically drawn to social administration. Perhaps social administration, 
therefore, has suffered from the same pre-positivist syndrome that existed 
in economics. If true, it is said, since it implies that the intellectual virtu es 
 of logical rigour are not valued in the disciplines of social administration) 
Moreover, if true, it denies to social administrators a source of philosophical 
pleasure much prized by economists and others using a rigorous deductive 
method. This comes from providing what one might call fundamental 
enlightenment' by demonstrating that a set of conclusions can be drawn 
from premisses apparently having no bearing on them at all: /for example, 
that an apparently patterned and consciously designed social system of 
exchange is the logical outcome of an unpatterned and unconscious series 
of individual acts, or that relatively more good quality wine than bad is 
drunk in England than France is strictly an implication of no more than 
the proposition that demand curves slope down. The beauty and profound 
intellectual satisfaction to be had from such analyses should not be denied 
anyone. 
However, there really is no evidence that intellectual rigour of this sort 
is unvalued by social administrators, though one can well understand that . 
some of those motivated by, say, the vocational aspects of social work feel 
impatience with these slower, more reflective, and more remote from 
policy, aspects of intellectual life. It should also be added that, whatever 
	 , 
tensions may exist today within social administration, it is doubtful if 
they are likely to be resolved by positivism. 
What may be conjectured to have been more inhibiting to social adminis-
trators about the discipline of economics than its rigour are some of its 
conventional assumptions about human behaviour. There has got around 
the idea that economic analysis, and hence the discipline of economics, is 
predicated upon a particularly nasty reductionist conception of 'economic' 
man: to whit, that he is selfish, calculating, and completely predictable in a 
machine-like way. There have been some recent attempts" at trying to per-
suade people that this is not the case. Indeed, if it were this author, for one, 
should have had to cease regarding himself as an economist. The responsi-
bility for allowing this message to get around lies firmly on the shoulders 
15 See A. J. Culyer, The Political Economy of Social Policy, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1980. 
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of economists themselves, particularly those who write elementary text-
books and do often assume selfishness (quite gratuitously), calculation (quite 
erroneously) and predictability (on the grounds that uncertainty is a diffi-
cult subject best postponed to the third year of undergraduate studies by 
which time students have forgotten that they used to worry about the 
monsters they were assuming in their models). 
There is also another feature of economics which may have been instru-
mental in causing its cinderella status in social administration. In his 
fascinating exploration of the idea of welfare Pinker" notes that what he 
calls the collectivist bias of social administration has been more deeply in-
fluenced by socialist than by (neo)classical economic theory. The observa-
tion seems correct. But the phenomenon is based upon a misconception: 
namely that non-Marxian economics, particularly microeconomics, is in-
herently antipathetic to socialist political philosophy, or is inherently well-
disposed towards laissez-faire liberalism. Quite aside from the injustice done 
to those (many) wielders of neoclassical microeconomic weapons who regard 
themselves as socialists, social administrators do themselves a great disser-
vice, if such is indeed a widespread belief, by thus discounting the value of 
a well-developed set of tools of analysis. Moreover, while it is well known 
that fundamental methodological dispute exists between Marxian econo-
mists and macro-neoclassicists, this is much less the case at the micro 
level. There are, of course, some types of collectivist perspective that would 
preclude on fundamental grounds the applicability of microeconomics, par-
ticularly welfare economics. For example, the view that social welfare is 
entirely independent of the welfare of the individuals who make up 
society. But few if any see such a perspective as an inherent part of social 
administration and it is certainly no part of social administration's 
Christian-socialist tradition, nor of its Fabian tradition. 
The mistaken belief may be seen to arise once again from a confusion 
of the topic with the discipline of economics. It is broadly true that 
the topic of economics in western society has focussed upon analysis of 
markets. But it is also true that as many economists adopting the neoclassi-
cal view of the world have been highly critical as have been highly suppor-
tive of market structures. This is possible because the discipline of econom-
ics contains no inherent predisposition towards socialism or liberalism other 
than what necessarily flows from taking the individual human being as the 
fundamental unit of concern — and that only rules out particular species of 
socialism (and fascism). 
As it happens, it appears that the bulk of the work done by social 
administrators is on topics that are more micro than macro. It is precisely in 
16 R. Pinker, The Idea of Welfare, Heinemann, London, 1979. 
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such areas, as is argued later, that economics is most likely to be useful 
and useful to collectivists, socialists, liberals, libertarians, and so on, alik e. 
But it is not only in such micro policy concerns either that neoclassical 
economics has something of great value to offer.Some of the great metho-
dological and philosophical questions of our day concern how it is that w e 
 move from perceptions of the welfare of individuals to a perception of the 
welfare of a group or of society as a whole (the analysis of 'public choice'). 
Here there can be no question that neoclassical welfare economics has made 
enormous strides — strides that are unparalleled in any other disciplines and 
strides that have no predisposition for or against collectivism.'' 
There is another feature of social administration which corresponds 
neither to its characterization as a topic nor to its characterization as a set 
of disciplines. It is a feature related to a point made above concerning the 
empirical traditions of social administration and it is a feature to be, in my 
judgement, regretted. This is the characteristic which Warham has identi-
fied as (a primary commitment to the promotion of individual and social 
welfare through the process of social reform 'Der italics). 18 It is related to 
what Titmuss termed 'disinterested servility' which, if correctly under-
stood, relates to a concern for others — '`a concern about education rather 
than training; a concern about the ethics of intervention in the lives of 
other people; and a lack of concern with academic or professional status '.19 
In a famous remark, made at the inaugural meeting of the Social Adminis-
tration Association, Titmuss said 'social administration as a subject is not a 
messy conglomeration of the technical ad hocAts primary areas of unifying 
interest are centred in those social institutions that foster integration and 
discourage alienation'i" The first sentence must surely be right. The second, 
however, cuts across the topics and disciplines of social administration by 
defining a special attitude towards them an attitude, moreover, that is 
richly imbued with value judgements — that characterizes the subject (both 
as topic and discipline) of social administration. 
Part of the reason why social administration got itself into these diffi-
culties over its identity arose, one conjectures, from its origins in the voca-
tional and professional subject of social work, which has been widely criti-
cized (whether rightly is not for present purposes relevant) for its lack of a 
theoretical base. The articulation of an ideological commitment to welfare, 
17 A superb review for those unfamiliar with this territory is D. C. Mueller, Public Choice, 
Cambridge University Press, London, 1979. 
19 J. Warham, 'Social administration and sociology', Journal of Social Policy, z (1973), 193-
x07. 
19 J. H. Smith, 'The human factor in social administration', Journal of Social Policy, 8 
(1979), 433-48. 
20 R. M. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare, Allen and Unwin, London, 1968, p. 22.  
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to altruism, to the idea of service to the community, to universality, to the 
importance of understanding 'what it is like' to be poor, discriminated 
against, and so on, helped to provide a unifying intellectual focus that was 
(so it has been asserted) otherwise lacking. 
But if at one time this kind of idea served a useful purpose in integrating 
social administrators by giving them a shared vision — one hesitates to use 
the term paradigm — it seems to be an idea whose day has past. For one 
with 
it it always had the danger within it of identifying an academic subject ha 
particular political philosophy — liberal socialism — which tended 
inescapably to bring its genuine contributions into disrepute among those 
pot sharing this political viewpoint. For another it tended to exclude from 
the ranks of social administration those who held different political view-
points. What the costs of this have been is hard to calculate — but try to 
imagine modern political philosophy without, say, Locke or Rousseau; or 
modern economics without Pareto or Marx. The point, of course, is that 
/ open discourse within topics and disciplines furthers the advancement of 
/ all knowledge. One does not have to be a Paretian or Marxist economist to 
recognize the importance of the contributions of these great men, and even 
those who differ in their values from either (or both) of these cannot fail 
to acknowledge their intellectual indebtedness to both. 
But the chief objection to this injection of an idea of 'commitment to 
;welfare' is simply that it is an encumbrance if it is taken as part of the 
definition of the subject of social administration. At any one time there 
may be a hegemony of values within any subject and if that hegemony is 
the hegemony of a noble and beautiful idea, so much the better. But it is 
wholly unnecessary to absorb that hegemony into the definition of the 
subject. Whatever it may at one time have needed to bind itself together, 
social administration does not require this encumbrance now: A commit-
ment to the multidisciplinary exploration of the topic of social policy is an 
eminently worthy and rewarding commitment in itself. 
There are, of course, 'commitments' within economics, too. Ultimately, 
there is no escaping the conclusion that the central idea of efficiency, which 
pervades the whole of neo-classical welfare economics, has a strong value 
content. But we need to note two things that make this type of commit-
ment different from that which has been held to be the essence of social 
administration. First, and most obviously, the idea of efficiency has positi-
vist uses as well as normative. Economics viewed as a behavioural science 
can thus use the idea of efficiency (viz. the postulated maximization of a 
behavioural objective function subject to constraints) in a way that is value 
free, that is, the test of the 'acceptability' or otherwise of the objective 
function is empirical rather than ethical. Secondly, and more subtly, the 
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ethical idea of efficiency, as something for which society should strive, i s 
 much less politically restrictive than the idea of 'commitment to welfare'. 
In normative analysis, the welfare function to be maximized is not speci el 
by any preconceptions other than that 'social welfare' is ultimately th e 
 welfare of individuals. For example, it may, according to taste, be postu-
lated to be egalitarian or inegalitarian. The constraints subject to which 
social welfare is to be maximized (for efficiency) may similarly include not 
only those constraints imposed by nature (e.g. resource constraints) or thos e 
 imposed by what is believed to characterize what is rational (e.g. transi-
tivity in preference orderings) but may also be constrained by value judge. 
ments — for example that the welfare of future generations count for as 
much (or more, or less) than that of those who are presently alive. Thus, 
to the extent that value judgements are embodied in (welfare) economics, 
there is much greater freedom for analysts of policy who use this frame-
work to inject a variety of value judgements according to their taste. It is 
thereby less exclusive and less divisive, and the community of economi c 
 scholars (even neo-classical ones) is not, as a result, defined by any particu-
lar political commitment. The one value question that does characterize the 
neoclassical community is its commitment to the idea of the individual as 
the basis for all welfare analysis — but this it shares with most of those who 
consider themselves to be social administrators. 
ECONOMICS AS A DISCIPLINE OF SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION 
With all this as background, we may now turn to the contribution of 
economics (the discipline) to social policy. The contribution of the disci-
pline of economics to the topic of social administration and the contribu-
tion of the discipline of economics to the other disciplines of social adminis-
tration are considered first. In so doing it will be argued first that there are 
some topics in social administration which are almost exclusively proper 
fields of application of the discipline of economics, second that there are 
some topics in social administration where the discipline of economics is a 
necessary but by no means sufficient contributing discipline, and third that 
in the purely intellectual realm there is a contribution of the discipline of 
economics that can enrich the contributions of the other disciplines of 
social administration. Those topics of social administration where the disci-
pline of economics has no, or little, contribution to make will not be con-
sidered. As a preliminary, however, it should be emphasized that the three 
distinctions just made should not be seen as hard and fast independent 
categories: there is a shading-off between them. The broad distinctions are 
none the less useful as an organizing principle for discussion. It is also 
worth noting that the relationships between the discipline of economics 
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and the topics and other disciplines of social administration is a reciprocal 
one. Here we shall focus on the contribution of economics to these things, 
but there can be no doubt there is a reciprocal contribution from them: 
they also feed back in useful ways upon the discipline and topic of eco-
nomics. The treatment will be summary and illustrative, though hopefully 
suggestive. The issues will be explored in much greater detail elsewhere." 
Exclusively Proper Topics of Social Administration to the t-r I ply I °Aar 
Discipline of Economics 
The general character of the topics falling under this head consists of prob-
lems arising in the topic of social administration that involve the efficient 
allocation of scarce resources and/or the modelling of human behaviour 
individually or in groups,, where considerations making the application of 
other disciplines relevant are not immediately present. Since nearly all 
problems of social policy ultimately involve the making of ethical judge-
ments, it follows that topics falling under this head are usually rather 
limited ones whose full consideration will eventually involve the other 
disciplines of social administration: for example ethics and political philo-
sophy. That accounts for the use of the qualifying adjective 'immediately'. 
This, of course, is merely to say that there is no ultimate sense in which 
Leconomics as a discipline is ever really sufficient to resolve a policy problem. 
The kind of question that none the less falls fairly unambiguously into 
this set is illustrated by the following (some studies characteristic of 
economic answers to the questions are appended in brackets and listed in 
the footnote)." 
— what are the effects on the supply of labour time of changing marginal 
rates of income tax? (Godfrey 1975) 
21  In a paper for the Social Administration Association's meeting in Leeds 1981. 
22 L. G. Godfrey, Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of the Effects of Taxation on the 
Supply of Labour, OECD, Paris, 1975; A. B. Atkinson and J. S. Flemming, 'Unemploy-
ment, social security and incentives', Midland Bank Review, Autumn (1978), 6-16; 
M. S. Feldstein, 'The welfare loss of excess health insurance', Journal of Political 
Economy, 81 (1973), 251-8o; C. M. Lindsay, 'Demand with zero-priced care', in C. M. 
Lindsay, National Health Issues: the British Experience, Roche, New Jersey, 1980; R. G. 
Evans and H. D. Walker, 'Information theory and the analysis of hospital cost struc-
ture', Canadian Journal of Economics, 5 (1972), 398-418; A. J. Culyer, J. Wiseman, M. F. 
Drummond and P. A. West, 'What accounts for the higher costs of teaching hospitals?' 
Social and Economic Administration, 12 (1978), 20-9; P. R. G. Layard and D. W. Verry, 
'Cost functions for university teaching and research', Economic Journal, 85 (1975), 55 -
74; M. Jones-Lee, The Value of Life: an Economic Analysis, Martin Robertson, London, 
1976; J. Le Grand, 'The distribution of public expenditure: the case of health care', 
Economica, 45 (1978 ), 125-42; M. J. Boskin and M. D. Hurd, 'The effect of social security 
on early retirement', Journal of Public Economics, to (1978), 361-78; J. Mincer, 'Unem-
ployment effects of minimum wages', Journal of Political Economy, 84 (1976), S87—S1o4; 
L. Needleman, 'The comparative economics of improvement and new building', Urban 
Studies, 6 (1969), 196-209. 
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- what are the effects on labour force participation of changes in 
replacement ratio? (Atkinson and Flemming 1978) 
- what welfare gains and losses result from changing the coinsura 
rate in health insurance programmes? (Feldstein 1973) 
- what effect on hospital waiting lists results from changing the nuin 
of hospital consultants? (Lindsay 198o) 
- what accounts for cost differences in hospitals? (Evans and Walker 
1972) 
- what costs of medical education are borne by the National Health 
Service rather than the University Grants Committee? (Culyer et al. 1978) 
- what increase in public expenditure is associated with changing the 
numbers of graduate and undergraduate students in universities? 
(Layard and Verry 1975) 
- what value for human life is implied by the choices people actually 
make concerning risks to their lives? (Jones-Lee 1976) 
- what is the incidence of benefits from social service spending? (Le 
Grand 1978) 
- what effect do social security provisions have on early retirement? 
(Boskin and Hurd 1978) 
- to what extent have minimum wage laws caused unemployment? 
(Mincer 1976) 
- is it cheaper to renovate or rebuild council houses? (Needleman 1969). 
As the questions addressed by these studies indicate fairly clearly, the 
questions to which the application of the discipline of economics can give 
answers - sometimes quantitative, sometimes qualitative - are only partial. 
They provide necessary pieces of information to inform intelligent social 
policy-making; they do not provide any 'final solution' - the least cost 
hospital is not necessarily the one that should be built, a replacement ratio 
in excess of i oo per cent is not necessarily to be avoided. 
Topics of social administration where the discipline of economics 
complements and is complemented by other disciplines 
If a characteristic of the first category of social administration topic was 
that other disciplines may become relevant at another stage (perhaps a 
higher stage) of analysis (such as whether the value of life revealed in the 
study mentioned ought to be used in social policy decisions involving the 
saving of lives), it is a characteristic of this second category that there is 
mutual advantage in the joint application of economics and one or more of 
the other disciplines of social administration. Common (though not neces-
sary) features of such topics are that they concern the measurement and 
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evaluation of outcomes of policies and that they involve non-market trans-( 
actions. In the following illustrations some of the other disciplines that may 
be usefully involved are placed in parentheses: 
- what effects on the rate of particular types of criminal activity follow 
from changing the probability of its being detected and/or the severity 
of punishment? (economics, psychology, sociology) 
- what is health status? (economics, sociology, epidemiology, psychology, 
psychiatry) 
- what effects on population growth follow from more effective birth 
control methods? (economics, demography, sociology) 
- should education be provided free of charge? (economics, sociology, 
educational psychology, political philosophy, ethics) 
- how should inequality be measured? (economics, political philosophy, 
statistics) 
- why do people choose to become doctors? (economics, psychology, 
sociology) 
- what is poverty? (economics, sociology, political philosophy). 
We need not prolong the list. As can be seen, topics of this sort contain 
many of the great questions of social policy. It is, of course, scarcely sur-
prising that so many of the disciplines of social administration have some-
thing to contribute to these burning - and possibly inextinguishable -
issues. What economics as a discipline has to contribute alongside the other 
disciplines are, first, a behavioural model that has proved remarkably robust 
in prediction; second, a quantitative technique (econometrics) that enables 
one to incorporate non-economic variables (in the topical sense); third a 
clear conceptual organizing framework enabling one to make elem-entary 
but often elusive distinctions between fact and value, input and outcome, 
means and ends, and the like; fourth a normative basis for the partial 
appraisal of means and ends, namely that of efficiency. It is, of course, 
partial in the sense that efficiency is not the only value held by individuals 
in society, nor does it commit one, as has been argued above, to any specific 
view about the entities to be placed in an objective function, but it is that 
value which economics as a discipline is uniquely capable of handling. 
Intellectual enrichment of other disciplines 
It was remarked above that it is scarcely surprising that the central disci-
plines of social administration (which are taken to be economics, sociology 
and political philosophy including ethics) have each evolved analyses of 
the burning issues of social policy. It is mainly because of this that each 
discipline can contribute much at the purely intellectual level to the others. 
Insularity, disciplinary amours propres, and academic institutional struc- 
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tures often militate against the kind of interplay here in mind There are 
some intellectual topics where the evidence is overwhelming that such 
interplay is very productive. They are relatively few, but immensely impor-
tant. Two illustrative cases of fruitful interplay between disciplines in the 
realm of ideas concern the idea of 'need' and the idea of `social justice' (or 
`distributive justice'). 
The concept of need has had a hard time from economists but is clearly 
a central idea in the intellectual framework associated with the discipline s 
 of social administration. One detects, until the last decade or so, that the 
idea of need was typically used by social administrators in an ill-defined 
way that opened analyses employing it to the charge of special pleading. 
Of late, however, things have improved enormously. The work of Barry,22 
Culyer, Lavers and Williams, 24 Bradshaw 25 and Davies29 from their various 
disciplinary viewpoints (respectively, political philosophy, economics, multi-
disciplinary social administration and, again, economics) has created some-
thing of a revolution in the thinking of social administrators (of whatever 
principal discipline or multiple expertise). There is now a genuine dialogue 
over substantive issues and some meeting of minds, so that we can now all 
see more clearly the relationship between 'need' and `demand'," `need' 
and ` equality ', 28 the interplay of fact and value in the idea of need' 29 and 
one can now handle the idea with some confidence that one will neither be 
misunderstood nor have suspicion cast upon one's motives for using it. 
The idea of 'social justice' as a question of political philosophy has 
always been fairly penetrated by economics as a discipline by virtue of the 
common intellectual heritage of utilitarianism. The dialogue between 
political philosophers and economists on, for example, the social desirability 
of equality is as old as the discipline of economics and new contributions 
from the economics wing show no sign of drying up (the most recent 
strikingly original contribution is by Sen)." Alongside the utilitarian 
23 B. M. Barry, Political Argument, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965. 
24 A. J. Culyer, R. J. Lavers and Alan Williams, 'Social Indicators: health' Social Trends, 2 
(1971), 31-42. 
26 J. Bradshaw, 'A taxonomy of social need' in G. McLachlan (ed.), Problems and Progress 
in Medical Care, 7, Oxford University Press, London, 1972. 
29 See A. C. Bebbington and B. P. Davies, 'Territorial need indicators: a new approach' 
Parts I and II, Journal of Social Policy, 9 (1980), 145-68 and 433-62. 
27 Alan Williams, 'Need — an economic exegesis', in A. J. Culyer and K. G. Wright (eds), 
Economic Aspects of Health Services, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1978. 
28 A. Weale, Equality and Social Policy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978. 
29 A. J. Culyer, 'Need, values and health status measurement' in A. J. Culyer and K. G. 
Wright (eds), Economic Aspects of Health Services, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1978. 
30 A. K. Sen, 'Planners' preferences: optimality, distribution and social welfare' in J. 
Margolis and H. Guitton (eds), Public Economics, Macmillan, London, 1969. This is set 
out in a simplified version in A. J. Culyer, The Political Economy of Social Policy, op. cit. 
chapter 4. 
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approach to questions of social justice which has occupied the centre of the 
stage for decades, two new theories have emerged: Rawls' 31 development of 
social contract theory and Nozick's 32 development of the Lockean idea of 
natural rights. The important roles played by economic theories of choice 
and welfare in the former and economic theories of entitlement in the 
latter are well known. The theories, indeed, are unimaginable without 
them. The enormous excitement generated by these new ideas and their 
rapid incorporation into the intellectual streams of all the disciplines of 
social administration are evidence enough of the fruitfulness of interdisci-
plinary penetration. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I have tried to argue that social administration is a topic and a set of 
disciplines; that economics as a discipline has an important role to play in 
the exploration of the topic of social administration; and that economics 
as a discipline deserves greater prominence among the disciplines compris-
ing the set used in social administration. In summary, I have tried to show 
that there are important topics within social administration with which 
economics as a discipline is uniquely equipped to deal; that there are other 
topics in which economics has an important complementary role to play; 
and finally that economics has an important role to play at the purely 
intellectual level at which the disciplines of social administration interact. 
Who knows, but this multidisciplinary endeavour may lead in the fullness 
of time to the emergence of a new discipline of social administration, sui 
generis. Only time, of course, will tell. Meanwhile there is plenty of work 
for everyone to be getting on with. Social administration is likely to focus 
most particularly on those topics and ideas where the various disciplines 
are most frequently complementary. There are two reasons for this. One 
lies in the paramount practical and philosophical importance of those 
topics. But the other is that acadeniic departments of social administration 
provide one of the few examples of an institutionalized commitment to 
multidisciplinary research and teaching. One can be highly optimistic 
about the future of social administration — provided that it can hold on to 
its strengths and eschew its peripheral weaknesses. Economics has a contri-
bution as a discipline in this future of social administration, a contribution 
whose fruitfulness has been indicated. But it is only one discipline of several. 
Moreover it is only one of several equals. 
31 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972. 
22 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974. 
